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Abstract
We show, analytically and empirically, that there is a positive correlation between
default risk and the Basu measure of conservatism: the higher the default risk, the higher
the bias in the Basu measure. We use the insight provided by our analysis to construct
an improved version of the Basu measure, the Default-Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure.
The DAB measure adjusts for the eﬀects of default risk on the Basu measure. Using
Distance-to-Default as a measure of default risk, we contend that the DAB measure
can substantially reduce the bias caused by default risk, and hence is a more robust
measure of accounting conservatism than the standard Basu measure. We demonstrate
that once one adjusts for the distance-to-default, the Basu conservatism coeﬃcient is
no longer positively correlated with leverage.
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1 Introduction1
Basu (1997) introduced the first, and currently the most popular, empirical measure of ac-
counting conservatism, commonly known as the ‘Basu measure’, or the asymmetric timeliness
of earnings coeﬃcient. Since Basu’s influential paper, a substantial and growing literature
has emerged applying the Basu measure to examine accounting conservatism in a variety of
theoretical contexts.
However, the validity and characteristics of the Basu measure have received limited at-
tention in the literature. Dietrich et al. (2007), Givoly et al. (2007), Ryan (2006) and others
have examined the validity of the Basu measure and highlighted a number of weaknesses in
the Basu measure. Dietrich et al. (2007), for example, find that the Basu measure is biased
upward because of what they call the sample-variance-ratio bias and the sample-truncation
bias. Givoly et al. (2007) empirically test the validity of the Basu measure, and discover
that the measure can demonstrate neither the power to distinguish conservative firms from
aggressive ones nor the stability expected in a time-series context. These recent studies have
cast doubt on the validity of the Basu (1997) measure and motivate us to further examine
its validity from a default risk perspective.
This paper has the following three related objectives:
First, we extend the recent critical appraisal of the Basu measure by investigating the
relationship between the Basu measure and a firm’s default risk. Using Merton’s (1974)
call-option pricing model of equity, we show that the Basu measure is a biased measure of
the degree of accounting conservatism. We show, analytically and empirically, that there is
a positive correlation between default risk and the Basu measure of conservatism: the higher
the default risk, the higher the bias in the Basu measure. In general, default risk means
1Acknowledgments: We are especially grateful to Robert M. Bushman for suggesting the option-pricing
based method of estimating default risk. We also thank Michael Bradbury, Thomas Lys, Vincent O’Connell,
Richard Morris, Baljit Sidhu, Stephen L. Taylor, Peter Wells and all the participants at the University of
Technology Sydney 2009 Summer Accounting Consortium, the University of New South Wales Accounting
Research Seminar, the EAA 2009 Annual Congress, and the AAA 2009 Annual Meeting.
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the uncertainty around a firm’s ability to repay its debt when it falls due. In this paper, we
use Distance-to-Default (DD) to measure default risk. DD is an inverse measure of default
risk and we estimate DD using Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) option-pricing-based iterative
algorithm.
Second, we use the insight provided by our analysis of the Basu measure to construct an
improved version of the Basu measure. We call the new measure the Default-Adjusted-Basu
(DAB) measure, because it adjusts for the eﬀects of default risk on the Basu measure. We
contend that the DAB measure can substantially reduce the bias caused by default risk, and
hence is a more robust measure of accounting conservatism than the standard Basu measure.
Third, we demonstrate that once one adjusts for the distance-to-default, the Basu con-
servatism coeﬃcient is no longer correlated with leverage. This finding makes a clear and
substantive contribution by questioning some of the empirical justification of the conser-
vatism literature. In particular, we find that leverage and the actual degree of accounting
conservatism may not be positively correlated: instead, the positive correlation previously
observed in the literature may result from leverage controlling the extent of upward-bias in
the original Basu measure. Hence, we conclude that leverage is not a determinant of account-
ing conservatism as currently measured but is simply a control for bias in the Basu measure
of accounting conservatism.
Our analysis of the Basu measure bears a close relationship to the analysis of the earnings
response coeﬃcient (ERC) by Dhaliwal et al. (1991), who analytically show that there is a
negative association between a firm’s ERC and its default risk. Dhaliwal et al.’s finding im-
plies that there should also be a positive association between the Basu regression coeﬃcients
and default risk, because the Basu regression is essentially a reversed ERC regression. This
positive association between the Basu coeﬃcients and default risk is further analyzed in this
paper. Another similarity between this paper and Dhaliwal et al. (1991) is that both pa-
pers use the contingent claims methodology of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974).
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However, our paper goes beyond Dhaliwal et al. The finding in the current paper obtained
from the DAB measure has significant implications for how researchers should interpret the
fact that the original Basu measure is positively correlated with leverage. We find that the
DAB measure is not positively correlated with leverage.
Before proceeding to the main analysis, we briefly introduce the Basu measure itself. In its
most common form, the Basu (1997) measure is based on a cross-sectional, dummy-variable
regression of accounting earnings on stock returns, as follows:
NIit
Ei,t−1
= α0 + α1DRit + β0Rit + β1RitDRit + ￿it (1)
where
NIit: Net Income for firm i year t.
Ei,t−1: Opening market value of total equity for firm i year t.
Rit: Buy-and-hold percentage rate of return on equity for firm i year t.
By definition, Rit ≡ REit/Ei,t−1, where REit is the buy-and-hold
dollar return on equity and Eit is total dollar value of equity.
DRit: Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the return on equity for firm
i year t is negative, and equal to 0 if the return on equity for firm
i year t is non-negative.
The regression model above, known as the Basu model, regresses accounting earnings
(NIit/Ei,t−1) on stock returns (REit/Ei,t−1) separately for ‘good-news’ and ‘bad-news’ firms.
A firm-year is deemed a ‘good-news’ one if the return on its stock return is positive or zero,
and a firm-year is deemed a ‘bad-news’ one if its stock return is negative. By using the dummy
variable, DRit, the Basu model allows the slope coeﬃcients to diﬀer between the good-news
and bad-news groups (β0 and β0+β1, for good- and bad-news coeﬃcients respectively). The
diﬀerence between the bad- and good-news coeﬃcients, β1, is the Basu asymmetric timeliness
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coeﬃcient (’ATC’), which measures the degree of conservatism in the sample of firms.
The Basu (1997) model above is logically equivalent to regressing positive stock return on
earnings and then negative return on earnings separately – one is for the good-news timeliness
coeﬃcient and the other for the bad-news timeliness coeﬃcient, as shown in Equation 2
below. While we use the more popular piece-wise regression version of the Basu model (i.e.
Equation 1) in the empirical tests, we follow Dietrich et al.’s approach (2007) and use the
version in Equation 2 (i.e. having two separate regressions) in the theoretical discussions for
the convenience of simpler theoretical proofs. However, the end results are always the same
no matter which version of the Basu model is used.
NIit
Eit−1
= α + β
REit
Eit−1
+ µit where β =

β0, ∀REit ≥ 0
β2, ∀REit < 0
β1 = β2 − β0
(2)
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 analytically examines how default
risk impacts on the Basu measure, and develops the Default-Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure
of accounting conservatism. Section 3 discusses the sample data and the proxies used in the
empirical tests. Section 4 reports the main empirical results with respect to both the original
Basu measure and the DAB measure. Section 5 reports the results of the robustness tests.
Section 6 discusses the implications of this paper for the accounting literature and, finally,
the paper presents in Section 7 a summary of our conclusions.
2 The link between the Basu measure and default risk
In this section, we analytically derive the relationship between default-risk and the Basu
measure of conservatism. In section 2.1, we develop a simple analytical model to demonstrate
that the Basu measure is confounded by default risk. In section 2.2, we propose the Default-
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Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure and show that the DAB measure is not aﬀected by default
risk.
2.1 A simple analytical model
Here we use a simple analytical model to demonstrate that default risk can create a con-
founding bias in the Basu asymmetric timeliness coeﬃcient (ATC) measure of accounting
conservatism. To keep the exposition simple, our model has only one firm in a single period
setting and a tax-free world. All investors, whether debt or equity, are assumed to be risk
neutral.2 Also for simplicity, we assume that the risk-free rate of interest is zero, implying
that the investors’ intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one. However the assumption of
zero risk free rate does not rule out the existence of risk-premiums in the bond market. In
addition, it is also assumed that the capital market is both complete and eﬃcient, and the
product market is characterized by perfect competition. The perfect competition condition
guarantees that there will be no ex ante abnormal returns to be made by investing in this
firm. At the start of the single period, date t0, the firm has a debt in the form of a zero
coupon bond with face value D which is the amount that must be repaid at the end of the
period, date t1. At the terminal date t1, the firm generates a random terminal cash flow￿x ∈ X, which has a certain statistical distribution f(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X.3 The expected
value of x˜ is µ, and the standard deviation of x˜ is σ.
Because a rational investor would not agree ex ante to take on a negative NPV project,
we must impose the regularity condition that the expected value of the cash flow is greater
than the face value of debt, thus, µ > D. In other words, the regularity condition guarantees
2There is however no diﬃculty in generalizing the analytical result to a risk-averse world, which can be
achieved by simply using risk-neutral probabilities instead of real probabilities for the random cash flow x˜.
3(1) In this general discussion of the analytical model, we abstract from the specific forms of distribution
of cash flow x˜ in order to obtain the most general possible result. Later in the computer simulations in Section
2.2, we demonstrate this general result by using two specific distributions of x˜: the uniform distribution and
the lognormal distribution. (2) To avoid the negative cash flow situation which is inconsistent with limited
corporate liability, the set X consists only of non-negative numbers.
6
that the ex ante value of equity, which is the value of equity on date t0, is strictly positive,
thus avoiding the case of negative NPV.
Given the structure developed above, we can now derive the behavior of the value of the
firm’s equity (i.e, stock price). Because the capital market is fully eﬃcient, the available
information regarding the distribution of x˜ is fully and accurately reflected in the stock price
at date t0 ex ante. First, we follow the well-known Merton (1974) model of equity and
characterize equity as a call option written on the underlying cash flow of the firm, with the
maturity value of the debt D as the exercise price. Thus, the value of equity at date t0 can
be given by the following formula (Merton, 1974):
E0 = E [max (x˜−D, 0)] (3)
At date t1, the information about the actual realization of x˜ becomes available, the cash flow
x˜ is realized and thus uncertainty no longer exists. The value of equity adjusts accordingly
and becomes
E˜1 = max (x˜−D, 0) (4)
Using the value of equity at the beginning and the end of the period, the firm’s rate of return
on equity, R˜, can be calculated according to the following formula
R˜ =
E˜1 − E0
E0
=
max (x˜−D, 0)− E0
E0
(5)
In this tax-free world, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital structure theory must
hold for this firm: (1) the present value of the firm is simply the expected value of cash flow,
µ; (2) the present value of equity is E0; and (3) the present value of debt is B = µ − E0.
The behavior of the values of equity and debt as a function of the terminal cash flow x˜ is
illustrated in Figure 1. The graph in Figure 1 shows that when the firm makes less cash
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Figure 1: Illustration of the terminal value of debt and equity as functions of terminal cash
flow
flow than the face value of debt D, the debt-holders will receive all of the cash flow and the
equity-holder nothing; when the firm’s cash flow is exactly D or greater, the debt-holder will
receive exactly the amount D, and the equity-holder the surplus of the cash flow over D.
From Equation 3, we have E0 = E [max (x˜−D, 0)], and we know thatmax (x˜−D, 0) is a
convex function of x˜. Jensen’s inequality implies that E [max (x˜−D, 0)] ≥ max (E [x˜]−D, 0).
The right-hand side of the inequality can be simplified to µ−D, because µ > D which is one
of our assumptions. We have just proved that E0 ≥ µ−D. In economic terms, this result can
be interpreted as stating that equity-holders must pay more to purchase the firm’s stock than
simply the expected value of the firm minus the face value of the debt. This is because the
equity-holders’ payoﬀ function is convex, which results from limited liability. For example,
when cash flow x is lower than a particular value that correspond to the maturity value of
debt, equity-holders will not longer suﬀer any greater loss than their original investment and
will not be liable to reimburse debtholders for their loss. Conversely, the debt-holders pay
less than the maturity value D, since they must be compensated for default risk.
The face value of debt, D, directly determines the capital structure and thus is the main
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determinant of the firm’s default risk. A high D signifies that the firm is more heavily debt-
financed, whereas a low D means that the firm is more equity-financed. At the same time, the
higher the level of debt D, the higher is the default risk of the firm, as the same underlying
cash flow x˜ will now have to pay oﬀ a greater amount of debt before equityholders can be
paid a return.
Now consider how the accounting system reports earnings conditional on receiving the
cash flow information x˜. When information about the realization of x˜ becomes available at
date t1, earnings e are announced. But since the accounting system is biased by accounting
conservatism, e is not generally equal to the actual cash flow x. In particular, an asymmetry
exists in earnings, as good news and bad news are handled diﬀerently by a conservative
accounting system. If the actual cash flow x is greater than the expected value µ, i.e. x > µ,
then there is good news; conversely if x < µ, then there is bad news. More specifically, under
conservatism, earnings are reported in the following manner:
e = µ+ k (x− µ)− i (6)
where
k =

k0 if x ≥ µ
k2 if x < µ
and i is the accrued implicit interest expense that the firm recognizes. Even though the debt
has a zero coupon rate, the implicit interest expense is recognized in earnings. The interest
expense is determined by the diﬀerence between the maturity value of debt at date t0 and
the purchase price of the debt at date t1, that is i = D−D0. Also notice that for a maturity
value of debt D, the interest expense is non-stochastic as both D and D0 are known at date
t0.
Using Basu’s terminology, k0 is the good news timeliness of earnings, whereas k2 is bad
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news timeliness of earnings. The degree of accounting conservatism is naturally defined as
k1 ≡ k2 − k0 (7)
The parameters k0, k1 and k2 are not observable but can be estimated by running the Basu
regression in Equation 1 or Equation 2 above. The solution of estimating these three pa-
rameters proposed by Basu (1997) is naturally to run the Basu regression in Equation 1 or
Equation 2, both of which yield identical results. The resulting Basu asymmetric timeliness
of earnings coeﬃcient (“ATC”), β1, measures the degree of conservatism, k1, calculated as
follows:
ATC ≡ β2 − β0 (8)
=
cov
￿
R˜, e˜/E0 | R˜ < 0
￿
var
￿
R˜ | R˜ < 0
￿ − cov
￿
R˜, e˜/E0 | R˜ ≥ 0
￿
var
￿
R˜ | R˜ ≥ 0
￿ (9)
In the equation above, the stock return R˜ is a random variable which can be viewed as many
independent realizations of stock return generated by the corresponding realizations of cash
flow x˜. This can be thought of as the same firm engaging in many repeated independent
single period games like this, or as many independent firms with identical return distributions
and with their cash realizations ocurring at the same time.
The Basu ATC depends on stock returns, R, as a proxy for the underlying cash flow news
x, but they are not the same thing. Equation 5 shows that R is a function not only of cash
flow x but also of debt D, which is a determinant of default risk. The debt factor is also
carried over into the Basu ATC calculation, and is thus the source of the confounding bias
in the ATC. It is conceivable that if D changes, the stock return R will also change, which in
turn impacts on the value of the ATC. In other words, the Basu ATC is a function of both
k1 and D rather than just k1 alone.
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In order to analyze the precise relationship between the Basu measure, ATC, and the level
of debt D, we must first substitute for R and e in Equation 8 in terms of their definitions
and simplify the resulting expression:
ATC =
cov
￿
R˜, e˜E0 | R˜ < 0
￿
var
￿
R˜ | R˜ < 0
￿ − cov
￿
R˜, e˜E0 | R˜ ≥ 0
￿
var
￿
R˜ | R˜ ≥ 0
￿ (10)
=
cov
￿
E˜1−E0
E0
, µ+k2(x˜−µ)−iE0 | x˜ < µ
￿
var
￿
E˜1−E0
E0
| x˜ < µ
￿ − cov
￿
E˜1−E0
E0
, µ+k0(x˜−µ)−iE0 | x˜ ≥ µ
￿
var
￿
E˜1−E0
E0
| x˜ ≥ µ
￿ (11)
=
cov
￿
E˜1, k2x˜ | x˜ < µ
￿
var
￿
E˜1 | x˜ < µ
￿ − cov
￿
E˜1, k0x˜ | x˜ ≥ µ
￿
var
￿
E˜1 | x˜ ≥ µ
￿ (12)
= k2
cov
￿
E˜1, x˜ | x˜ < µ
￿
var
￿
E˜1 | x˜ < µ
￿ − k0 cov
￿
E˜1, x˜ | x˜ ≥ µ
￿
var
￿
E˜1 | x˜ ≥ µ
￿ (13)
The first quotient in the above equation is the bad news timeliness coeﬃcient and the second is
the good news timeliness coeﬃcient. The entire equation is the Basu asymmetric timeliness
of earnings coeﬃcient, which is the bad news timeliness coeﬃcient minus the good news
timeliness coeﬃcient. Both R˜ and E˜1 are random variables here because they are unknown
when considered at date t0. (If they were known, then there would be no uncertainty and
thus no need to run regressions for estimation.) It is clear that in the second quotient, where
x˜ > µ, the value of equity E˜1, which is the greater of x˜−D and zero, is simply x˜−D, because
x > µ and µ > D. Thus, by substituting x˜ for E˜, the Basu good news timeliness coeﬃcient
becomes:
β0 = k0
cov
￿
E˜1, x˜ | x˜ ≥ µ
￿
var
￿
E˜1 | x˜ ≥ µ
￿ = k0var (x˜ | x˜ ≥ µ)var (x˜ | x˜ ≥ µ) = k0
Thus, we have shown that the Basu regression produces an unbiased estimate for the good
news timeliness of earnings, i.e. β0 = k0. However, this does not hold for the Basu bad news
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timeliness of earnings, β2. We provide in the Appendix an indicative proof that, given our
assumptions that µ > 0 and f(x) > 0, it follows that β2 > k2. That is, the Basu bad news
timeliness coeﬃcient, β2, is always biased upwards relative to the real degree of bad news
timeliness of earings, k2. Because the bad news coeﬃcient, β2, is upwards biased while the
good news coeﬃcient β0 is unbiased, it follows that the Basu ATC, which is the diﬀerence
between these two coeﬃcients, is also upwards biased. This result is formally stated in
Propositon 1 below.
Proposition 1. A firm’s asymmetric timeliness coeﬃcient (ATC) is upwards bi-
ased, if the firm has debt financing.
We next examine how the Basu ATC varies with the level of default risk in the firm.
We adopt as our measure of default risk Merton’s (1974) well-known ’distance-to-default’
construct (abbr. DD) defined as:
DD =
ln(At/D) + (α− σ2/2)t
σ
√
t
(14)
where DD is the distance to default of a firm at time t for a specific forecasting period into
the future, t; At is the gross value of the firm at time t, which is the sum of the value of
equity and the value of debt; D is the maturity value of debt as we have defined earlier; α
is the firm’s expected rate of growth; σ is the firm’s assets volatility; and t is the time until
maturity which counts downwards.
DD measures the diﬀerence (in standard deviations) between the value of a firm’s total
assets and the maturity value of its debt. DD is a negative measure of default risk: the lower
DD, the higher the default risk.
It is common practice to calculate the distance-to-default for 1 year ahead, as is in our
simple one period model, hence t = 1 (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003; Vassalou and Xing, 2004).
In our simple model the formula for DD thus reduces to:
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DD =
ln(µ/D)− σ2/2
σ
(15)
as (i) the value of assets A at date t0 is equal to the expected value of terminal cash flow, µ,
and (ii) the ex ante growth rate is zero.
Since both µ and σ are fixed by the underlying probability distribution of x˜, the only
source of variation in DD must come from the face value of debt D. In fact, the ratio µ/D
has a very intuitive economic meaning: it is the Assets-to-Debt ratio of a firm at time t, which
indicates the firm’s financial leverage. When the firms take on more debt as a proportion of
their total assets, the Asset-to-Debt ratio decreases, which leads to a decrease in DD. That
is, as the firm’s DD decreases, its default risk increases accordingly. This is formulated as
Proposition 2, below, which connects the Basu ATC with distance-to-default.4 The intuition
for this proposition is also discussed below.
Proposition 2. The bias in the Basu asymmetric timeliness coeﬃcient (ATC)
increases as the distance to default (DD) of the firm decreases (i.e. the default
risk of the firm increases).
The bias in the Basu measure analyzed in this paper departs from the model by Hayn
(1995) at the following two major points: First, the focus of our model is the Basu regres-
sion model, which is essentially a reverse ERC model, whereas Hayn’s (1995) focus is on an
ordinary ERC. Second, our model emphasizes the role of debt, whereas Hayn’s model empha-
sizes the eﬀect of abandonment options. Debt and abandonment options are conceptually as
well as practically diﬀerent, as a firm may still have the abandonment option even though
it has zero debt. Such a diﬀerence is especially significant, because our analysis has direct
4
Since it is D > 0 that produces the upward bias in the Basu ATC, it is obvious that the magnitude of the
bias is increasing in D. A proof of this result, based on mathematical induction, is available on request from
the corresponding author.
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implications for the large literature on the relation between debt financing and accounting
conservatism.
The above analytical propositions have been obtained without assuming any specific sta-
tistical distribution of the terminal cash flow x˜. In the Appendix, we illustrate these proposi-
tions using two computer simulations that are each based on specific statistical distributions
of x˜. One simulation is based on the uniform distribution and the other on the lognormal
distribution.
2.2 A Default-Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure of accounting conser-
vatism
Given the demonstrated bias in the standard Basu (1997) measure of conditional conser-
vatism, we propose a new measure of accounting conservatism. This new measure is a
modification of the standard Basu measure. The aim is to propose a measure of ‘conditional’
conservatism, which not only preserves the basic features of the original Basu (1997) mea-
sure, but is unbiased with respect to default risk. This new measure of conservatism, which
we call the Default-Adjusted-Basu (or “DAB”) measure, is estimated by fitting the following
regression model:
OIit
Ait−1
= a0 + a1DARit + b0R
A
it + b1R
A
itDARit + ￿it (16)
where OIit, operating income, is estimated by adding Pre-tax Interest Expense back to Net
Income (i.e. OIit = NIit + INTit).5 The value of the firm, Ait, which is the total of the
firm’s value of debt and value of equity, is estimated by Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative
algorithm (see Section 4 below).
5In an unreported robustness test, we find that the results of the DAB measure are not sensitive to whether
we add back After-tax Interest Expenses or Pre-tax Interest Expenses to Net Income, as both methods produce
very similar results.
14
RAit is the percentage return on assets for firm i year t. In our analytical model, RAit is
equivalent to (x˜−µ)/µ, the actual terminal cash flow minus the expected terminal cash flow.
Empirically, RAit is calculated as:
RAt =
At − At−1 − CFFt
At−1
(17)
where CFFit is the net cash flow from financing activities for firm i in year t, which is positive
for net cash inflows, and negative for net cash outflows. The term CFFit is there to control
for the firm’s capital financing transactions during the fiscal year. This term does not occur
in the analytical model because we make the simplifying assumption that the firm does not
conduct any capital financing transactions.
Lastly, the dummy variable, DARit, controls for good-news and bad-news. It is set equal
to 1, if RAit < 0; and is set equal to 0, if RAit ≥ 0. Hence, it is clear that the DAB measure
in Equation 16 has the same underlying structure as the standard Basu (1997) regression
model, but it utilizes diﬀerent proxies for accounting earnings and economic ‘news’. The
DAB measure of accounting conservatism is b1, in contrast to the standard Basu measure β1.
In the Appendix we show that bˆ1 is an unbiased measure of accounting conservatism and we
formulate the result as Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. The Default-Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measureof conservatism, which
is b1 estimated in Equation 16, is an unbiased measure of accounting conservatism.
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3 Proxies and data
3.1 The Vassalou and Xing (2004) iterative method
In this paper, we employ Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative method to calculate firms’
distance-to-default (DD) and firm value (A).6 Vassalou and Xing (2004) oﬀer a robust
iterative algorithm for calibrating the volatility (σ) and the daily values (A) of the firm, which
has the Merton (1974) model as its conceptual underpinning. This method is a relatively new
technique of calculating default risk and has shown considerable power in predicting firms’
default probabilities (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003). Bushman and Williams (2009) have recently
employed a similar approach to measuring the default risk in banks, an approach first used
by Ronn and Verma (1986). Although the approach taken by Ronn and Verma (1986) and
Bushman and Williams (2009) is similar to the Vassalou and Xing (2004) method, it diﬀers
from Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) method as it is not iterative.7 The iterative procedure has
a significant advantage over the non-iterative procedure, because variability in actual market
leverage is too great for the simpler approach to yield a reliable estimate of asset volatility
σ1.
Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative estimation method consists of the following steps:
(1) Use daily stock prices over the 12 months prior to the desired balance date to form an
initial estimate of the volatility of equity – σE. (2) Use the initial value, σE, to derive an
initial estimate of asset volatility, σ, by σ = EE+BVDσE. (3) Use the new σ to solve the
Black-Scholes-Merton equity-pricing equation for the value of At in each of the trading days
6We especially thank Robert M. Bushman for suggesting Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) iterative method of
estimating distance-to-default.
7Crosbie and Bohn (2003, pp. 16-17) point out that the iterative procedure adopted in the academic
literature by Vassalou and Xing was already being applied in practice by Moody’s KMV.
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over a 12 months period, as follows:8
Et = AtN(d1)−De−rtN(d2) (18)
where
d1 =
ln(At/D) + (r + σ2/2)t
σ
√
t
;
d2 = d1 − σ
√
t
(4) Obtain a new σ from the newly estimated daily values of At. This new σ is then used as the
input to the Black-Scholes-Merton equity-pricing equation in the next iteration. (5) Repeat
Steps 3 and 4, until the values of σ from two consecutive iterations converge, specifically,
where the diﬀerence between two consecutive σ is less than 10−3. In the actual computations
of this Vassalou and Xing algorithm on our sample data, most of the sample firm-years
converge quickly, usually within 2 to 3 iterations.
In this study, this iterative procedure is conducted once each year for every firm with a
December fiscal year-end.9 To be consistent with Vassalou and Xing (2004), the time until
debt repayment or refinancing, t, is set at 1 year for all firms. The firm’s steady growth rate
α, which is also its weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”), is calculated according to the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), as α = r+ βARiskPremium.10 We first estimate the
equity beta for each firm-year using prior monthly returns for up to 60 months, ending in
December of the year of estimation. In the case that there are less than 24 months of stock
return data available, we estimate the equity beta based on daily stock returns in the year of
8On average, there are 251 trading days per year.
9We remove all firms that do not have their fiscal year-ends in December.
10We do not follow Vassalou and Xing’s (2004) choice of the current year’s realized assets growth rate as
the firm’s expected steady growth rate, because the expected rate is usually diﬀerent from the realized rate.
Many firms have negative realized growth rates, but not many firms would have negative expected growth
rates.
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estimation itself. Once the equity betas (βE) are estimated, we then convert them into asset
betas (βA) by Hamada’s formula (ignoring income tax): βA = EE+BVDβE (Hamada, 1972).
After that, we can easily calculate the WACC for each firm-year using the estimated βA and
the appropriate market risk premium and risk-free rates. Based on Dimson et al. (2009), we
set the risk premium of the U.S. market at 5%. The risk-free rate, r, is the average rate of 3-
Month U.S. Treasury Bills in the relevant year. The default point, D, is approximated by the
firm’s total book liabilities reported, BVD, at every year-end, from the Compustat database.
Finally, DD is calculated for each firm year by using Equation 14 with the estimated values
of α and σ as well as the known values of D, r .
3.2 Sample and descriptive statistics
The raw sample consists of all non-financial firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
(national and OTC) exchanges from 1999 to 2006, excluding ADR firms. In order to simplify
the computations of the Vassalou and Xing (2004) algorithm, we select only those firms that
have a December fiscal year-end. To reduce the eﬀects of outliers, as in standard practice, we
trim the top and bottom 1% of the following variables11: Rit, EPSit/Pit−1, ACCit/TAit−1,
CFOit/TAit−1, OIit/Ait−1, and two estimated variables DDit and RAit . In addition, we delete
those observations with a missing value in any of the key variables, and those observations
with a zero or negative Market-to-Book (MTB) ratio. Since the Vassalou and Xing (2004)
algorithm requires 12 months of uninterrupted daily stock price data, we also delete those
firm-years that do not meet this requirement. The raw sample contains 14,167 firm-year
observations, and after the trimming process, the final sample consists of 12,531 firm-years,
spanning 8 calendar years from 1999 to 2006 inclusive.
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the final sample. All scale-related variables,
11In unreported sensitivity tests, we obtained similar results by alternatively trimming 0.5% and 2% from
the top and bottom of the range of each variable.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
    
      
      
      
     
      
      
      
     
     
     
      
      
      
      
     
    
    


Ait: value of (of the assets of) the firm, calculated using the Vassalou & Xing (2004) method; ACC: operating accrual according
to Ball & Shivakumar’s (2005) balance sheet method; CFO: cash-flow from operating activities; DD: distance-to-default
estimated with the Vassalou & Xing (2004) iterative procedure; BV A: total book value of assets; BVD: total book value of
current and long-term liabilities; EPS: basic earnings per share before extra-ordinary items; EPS/P : earnings per share divided
by opening share price; LEV : financial leverage, calculated as the sum of short- and long-term debt divided by the closing market
value of equity; MTB: closing market value of equity divided by closing net book value; MVE: closing market value of equity,
also denoted as E in the analytical section; NI: net income including extra-ordinary items; OIit/Ait−1: operating income (net
income + interest expense) divided by Ait−1; P : opening share price; R: buy-and-hold rate of return of equity stocks; RAit:
return on the value of the firm, calculated as RAit = (Ait−Ait+CFFit)/Ait−1, where CFFit is the net cash-flow from financing
activities; V OL (σ): assets volatility of the firm, i.e. volatility of the value of the firm, calculated using the Vassalou & Xing
(2004) method, measured in units of standard deviations of assets returns.
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Table 2: Correlation Table
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Note: Pearson correlations are above the main diagonal, and Spearman rank-correlations are below the main diagonal.20
such as Operating Accruals (ACC), Book Value of Assets (BV A), Cash Flows from Operating
Activities (CFO), Market Value of Equity (MVE) and Total of Current and Long-term
Liabilities (BVD), vary significantly across firms, because of the varying sizes of the firms.
The mean (median) of EPSit/Pit−1 is -1% (3%). The mean (median) of stock returns, R,
is 18% (6%). This is consistent with the existence of a “fat-tail” in the distribution of stock
returns. Several variables, such as DD, V OL (i.e. σ), and A, are calculated using the
Vassalou and Xing (2004) method, as described earlier. Table 1 shows that the mean DD
is 4.28 (in units of standard deviations), and the median is 4.05. Similarly, asset volatility,
V OL (which, in our earlier notation used in the Merton model, is σ), has a mean of 46%
(annualized), and a median of 35% (annualized). The mean (median) rate of return on
assets, RAit , is 10% (3%), which is significantly lower than that of the return on equity (R),
as expected.
The correlation table is reported in Table 2 and shows no unexpectedly high or low
correlation coeﬃcients. As expected, all size variables, such as MVE, BV A, NI and A,
are all positively correlated with each other. The percentage return on equity, Rit, is highly
positively correlated with the percentage return on assets, RAit , as illustrated by a Pearson
correlation of 0.92 and a Spearman rank-correlation of 0.95, as expected.
4 Main empirical results
4.1 Results for the standard Basu measure
If default risk does indeed induce an upward bias in the Basu measure, as determined in
Proposition 1, then one should empirically observe that the Basu measure, β1, increases with
the level of default risk in the sample firms. This forms the first aspect of our empirical
testing. To test this prediction, we follow the augmented regression approach commonly
applied in the relevant literature (e.g. LaFond and Watts, 2008; Roychowdhury and Watts,
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2007; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Lara et al., 2009a). In particular, we estimate the following
Basu regression augmented by DD:
EPSit
Pi,t−1
= α0 + α1DRit + α2DDit + β0Rit + β1Rit ·DRit (19)
+γ0Rit ·DDit + γ1Rit ·DRit ·DDit + ￿it
In equation 19, we test whether γ1, which is the coeﬃcient on the interaction between default
risk and the Basu ATC, has the desired sign. Since Proposition 1 predicts that DD is
negatively correlated with the Basu ATC, we expect γ1 to be (statistically) significantly less
than zero.12
Table 3 presents the results of the regression of our sample data. First, we estimate the
standard Basu model (in Column A), and the result shows that the standard Basu measure,
β1, is 0.210 and is significant at the 1% level. The estimated value of β1 is consistent with the
values reported in prior research (Basu, 1997; Ball et al., 2000; Bushman and Piotroski, 2006;
Pope and Walker, 1999). The good-news timeliness (β0 = −0.022) is significantly negative
at the 1% level, which is also consistent with the prior studies for U.S. firms in roughly the
same sample period (e.g. Bushman and Piotroski, 2006; Zhang, 2008).
The results of testing the main proposition that β1 increases in the degree of default
risk are reported in Columns B and C of Table 3. The regression in Column B augments
the standard Basu regression model with distance-to-default (DD). The coeﬃcient, γ1,
on the interaction term, DD · DR · R, is −0.011, and is (statistically) significant at the
1% level, indicating that default risk is positively associated with the Basu asymmetric
timeliness coeﬃcient. SinceDD is an inverse measure of default, this finding is consistent with
our theoretical prediction that default risk and the bias in the Basu measure are positively
correlated.
12Note that DD is a negative proxy for default risk. Thus, if the Basu ATC is negatively correlated with
DD, then it is positively correlated with default risk.
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Table 3: The association between the Basu measure of conservatism and distance-to-default
(DD)
  
     
         
        
         
         
   
   
  
   
   
   
  
   
   
      








DR is 0 if R ≥ 0 and 1 otherwise. R: arithmetic rate of stock return; DD: distance-to-default estimated with Vassalou & Xing’s
(2004) iterative method; DDRANK: percentile of DD. The dependent variable is EPSit/Pit−1 . Significance levels: *10%,
**5%, ***1%. All t-statistics are White-adjusted.
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Table 4: The association between the Default-Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure and distance-
to-default (DD)
  

      
        
        
        
        
   
   
 
 
   
   
 
 
   
      










The dependent variable of all 3 models is OIit/Ait−1. DARit is 0 if RAit ≥ 0 and 1 otherwise. RAit: the rate of return on assets
of the firm; DD: distance-to-default estimated with Vassalou & Xing’s (2004) iterative method; DDRANK: percentile of DD.
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. All t-statistics are White-adjusted.
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In order to control for any potential non-linearity in the relationship between DD and
the Basu measure, the regression in Column C augments the Basu model with the percentile
ranking of distance-to-default DDRANK. The resulting coeﬃcient on the interaction term,
DDRANK ·DR ·R, is −0.091, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result
further supports Proposition 1.
4.2 Results for the DAB measure
In Section 3 above, we constructed the DAB measure of accounting conservatism, as in
Equation 16, and developed the prediction that the DAB measure should exhibit little or no
correlation with distance-to-default DD. We test this prediction by conducting the following
augmented regression:
OIit
Ait−1
= a0 + a1DARit + a2DDit + b0R
A
it + b1R
A
it ·DARit (20)
+c0R
A
it ·DDit + c1RAit ·DARit ·DDit + ￿it
In light of our analytical results, we make the following empirical predictions:
1. b0 < β1: The DAB measure produces a lower measure of the degree of accounting
conservatism than does the Basu measure, because the DAB measure is unbiased whereas
the Basu measure is upward-biased.
2. c1 = 0: The DAB measure is not associated with the distance-to-default of sample firms,
because it is unbiased.
Table 4 presents the results of testing the DAB measure. First, the results reported in
Column A for the DAB regression model show that the value of the asymmetric timeliness
coeﬃcient (b1 = 0.129 in Table 4 ) is 34% lower than the standard Basu ATC (β1 = 0.210 in
Table 3). This diﬀerence between β1 and b1 is significant at the 1% level (the t-statistic is
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7.80).13 This suggests that there is an upward bias in the standard Basu measure. Second,
the results in Columns B and C of Table 4 for the two augmented regressions with DD and
DDRANK respectively show that c1, the interaction coeﬃcient between conservatism and
DD or DDRANK, is not significantly diﬀerent from zero in either regression. This is also
consistent with our theoretical prediction and thus lends direct support to the validity of
the DAB model. Therefore, our test results provide strong empirical evidence that the DAB
measure is more robust to default risk than is the standard Basu (1997) measure and that
the Basu (1997) measure systematically overestimates the degree of accounting conservatism
in samples where firms are under various degrees of financial distress.14
Finally, we wish to emphasize that the magnitude as well as the direction of the bias in
the Basu ATC is as economically significant and prevalent as it is statistically. Default risk
is a matter of degree and exists to some degree in almost all firms, as demonstrated by the
varying degree of distance-to-default that we find in our dataset. In other words, default
risk is not binary (i.e. default risk, no default risk), since as long as a firm has debt, it has
default risk. Therefore, while few firms in the stock market are on either end of the scale –
having either extremely high default risk or extremely low default risk – and the majority of
the firms carry a moderate, but non-zero, degree of default risk. Another implication of this
bias in the Basu measure is that it tends to confound the empirical research that investigates
the relationship between accounting conservatism and leverage, which is another proxy for
default risk. The last issue will be further discussed in Section 6 of this paper.
13This t statistic is derived from the formula: t = (β1 − b1)/
￿
SE(β1)2 + SE(b1)2.
14Given the computational complexity of the Vassalou and Xing procedure for measuring DD and the
significant data requirement, we also estimated the DAB measure by the simple method of substituting the
book value of debt for the market value of debt in the calculation ofAit. The resulting estimate of conservatism
was much the same as obtained from the standard Basu regression. This result indicates that the simplified
measure is not an adequate substitute for the Vassalou and Xing (2004) based approach. Nevertheless, the
result is useful because it supports there being a default-risk related bias in the Basu measure. The simplified
DAB measure ignores changes in the value of debt, which can be quite large when the firm has high risk of
default. As a consequence, the total return of the firm, as measured by the simplified method, understates
the true extent of the firm’s return when the firm’s default risk is high. The DAB regression coeﬃcients
would thus overstate the firm’s true degree of accounting conservatism. We are indebted to an anonymous
referee for this perspective on the result of the simplified approach.
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5 Robustness tests
5.1 Controlling for the potential identification issue
In the previous section, the empirical evidence showed that there is a positive correlation
between default risk and the Basu measure of conservatism. However, simply finding this
correlation is not a suﬃcient condition for the existence of bias in the Basu measure, be-
cause the real degree of accounting conservatism could also have increased when default risk
increases. Therefore, we face an identification problem: Is the increase in the Basu measure
when default risk increases the result of upward bias, or an increase in the actual degree of
conservatism, or both?
In the analytical section, we showed how default risk impacts on β1 via its impact on
D, while holding the true degree of accounting conservatism k1 constant. But the debt-
contracting theory of conservatism has argued that k1 might increase as a result of increased
risk-shifting to debt-holders from equity-holders under high default risks (Beatty et al., 2008;
Watts, 2003; Zhang, 2008). If this theory holds, then the Basu measure of conservatism, β1,
will also increase as a result of the increases in k1, even when there are no biases present
in the Basu measure itself. Therefore, it is important to control for the changes in the real
degree of conservatism, k1, in our tests.
To do that, we use the Asymmetric Accrual to Cashflow (AACF) measure of conservatism
developed by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) as the control variable for the actual degree of
conservatism. The AACF measure regresses the firm’s operating accruals on its operating
cashflows in the same time period, as follows:
ACCit = β0 + β1DCFOit + β2CFOit + β3DCFOit · CFOit + ￿it (21)
where
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• ACCit: Accruals measured as: ∆Inventory + ∆Debtors + ∆Other current assets -
∆Creditors - ∆Other current liabilities - Depreciation, all deflated by beginning total
book assets.
• DCFOit: Dummy variable that is set to 0 if CFOit ≥ 0 , and is set to 1 if CFOit < 0.
• CFOit: Cash-flow for period t, deflated by beginning total book assets.
• β3: the AACF measure of accounting conservatism.
Table 5 reports the results for the estimation of Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) AACF
measure (Equation 21). The regression reported in Column A is the standard AACF model.
Consistent with Ball and Shivakumar (2005), the standard AACF model shows a negative
good-news timeliness coeﬃcient (-0.105), and a positive asymmetric timeliness coeﬃcient
(0.148). Both coeﬃcients are significant at the 1% level.
The regressions reported in Column B and Column C of Table 5 augment the AACF
model with DD and DDRANK respectively. In the regression reported in Column B, γ1 is
0.007 which is not significant. The regression in Column C produces a similar result. The
results reported in Columns B and C thus show that the AACF measure of conservatism is
not associated with the default risk of the firm.
The regression results in Table 5 are in sharp contrast with the earlier results in Table 3.
In Table 3, the Basu measure is highly negatively correlated with DD, suggesting that the
Basu measure is positively correlated with default risk. But in Table 5, the AACF measure
of conservatism shows no correlation with DD at all. Thus, our robustness test suggests
that the increase in the Basu measure as default risk increases is likely the consequence of
the increasingly higher upward bias rather than changes in the actual degrees of accounting
conservatism.
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Table 5: Robustness Test: Ball & Shivakumar’s (2005) AACF measure of conservatism and
Distance-to-Default (DD)
  
     
         
        
         
         
   
  
  
  
   
  
   
  
   
      









DCFOit is 0 if CFOit ≥ 0, and 1 otherwise. CFO: operating cashflow divided by opening total book value of assets (BV A).
DD: distance-to-default estimated with Vassalou & Xing’s (2004) iterative method; DDRANK: percentile of DD. Dependent
variable in all 3 models is operating accrual divided by opening total assets – ACCit/BV Ait−1. [For representational convenience,
the denominator, BV A, is not shown in the table.] Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%. All t-statistics are White-adjusted.
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Figure 2: Box-plot of distance-to-default (DD) – “normal firm-years” vs. “outliers”
 
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5.2 Characteristics of “outliers”
Our second robustness test is of a diﬀerent character to the other empirical tests conducted in
the paper. While the other tests examine certain a priori theoretical predictions, the current
test begins with no a priori theory at all – instead we let the dataset reveal its patterns and
characteristics. This is done by detecting the “outliers” of the sample data based on a pure
statistical technique, Cook’s distance, which we introduce below.
In regression analysis, “outliers” are relative to the regression model itself. Fox (1997)
contends that if a regression model has omitted some important (and correlated) explanatory
variables, the data will likely show “outliers”. In a strict sense, they are not “outliers” at all;
rather, they are merely observations with special characteristics that the existing regression
model fails to explain.
The main regression model in this paper is the standard Basu (1997) model. To identify
“outliers”, we first separately estimate the Basu model year-by-year from 1999 to 2006 inclu-
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sive.15 Then, we calculate the Cook’s distance (CD) for each firm-year observation. Using
the cut-oﬀ recommended by Fox (1997), we label any firm-year with CD > df/(n−df−1) as
an “outlier” (df is the degrees of freedom, n is the number of observations). After classifying
firms into “normal” firms and “outliers”, we compare the levels of distance-to-default (DD)
between these two groups of firms. Figure 2 graphically depicts this comparison. An analysis
of variance (ANOVA) shows that the “outliers” have lower DD than the “normal” firms. The
average DD in “normal” firms is 4.374. In contrast the average DD in “outliers” is 2.775. The
diﬀerence is statistically significant at the 1% level. In summary, this analysis of “outliers”
suggests that firms with high default risk possess quite diﬀerent characteristics from firms
with low default risk, and it appears that the standard Basu model fails to capture that
diﬀerence. Thus, in an indirect way, this analysis corroborates the argument that default
risk is an omitted variable in the Basu measure.
6 Implication: Is leverage really a determinant of ac-
counting conservatism?
Khan and Watts (2009), Watts (2003), LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Lara et al.
(2009b) argue that leverage is an important determinant of accounting conservatism. In
particular, those studies claim that there exists a higher debt-contracting demand for ac-
counting conservatism from firms with higher leverage ratios. They argue that the demand
for higher degrees of conservatism arises from the fact that there is a more severe agency
conflict between shareholders and debtholders in highly leveraged firms. In such firms, a
variety of forms of opportunistic behaviors on the part of the shareholders could occur at
the expense of the debtholders, such as excessive dividends and/or asset substitutions. As
15This robustness test does not include the trimmed data, because the purpose of this test is to show that
“outliers” still exist in the Basu model even after extreme values have been trimmed way, and to understand
the characteristics of these “outliers”.
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a response to these agency problems, the debtholders tend to demand a greater degree of
accounting conservatism from the firm in order to protect themselves, because higher degrees
of conservatism can benefit the debtholders by (1) timelier defaults of debt covenants, and
(2) constraining opportunistic behaviors on the part of the managers and shareholders (Khan
and Watts, 2009).
Table 6: Leverage vs. Measures of Conservatism
  
     
  
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
     














 

















 





 











 



The prior literature often justifies the above theoretical proposition based on the empirical
finding that there is a positive correlation between financial leverage and the Basu measure
of accounting conservatism (e.g. Khan and Watts, 2009; LaFond and Watts, 2008; LaFond
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and Roychowdhury, 2008; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Lara et al., 2009b). However, a firm’s
leverage ratio is also closely related to its default risk (and thus its distance-to-default), and
therefore, the positive correlation between the Basu measure and the leverage ratio can also
be explained by the existence of an upward bias in the standard Basu measure: the bias
tends to increase as the firm has higher default risks, which is closely associated with the
firm’s leverage ratio. In other words, leverage is found to be positively associated with the
Basu measure, not because the real degree of conservatism has increased with leverage, but
because leverage causes an upwards bias in the Basu measure.
In Table 6, we conduct some empirical tests in order to test the eﬀect of leverage on all
three diﬀerent measures of accounting conservatism that we have used in the paper - the
Basu, DAB and AACF measures. Similar to Khan and Watts (2009), we calculate leverage
as the sum of short- and long-term debt divided by the closing market value of equity. When
the firm is more financial distressed, its market value of equity tends to be lower compared
to the size of its debt, resulting in a higher leverage ratio.
In Column A of Table 6, we interact the Basu measure with leverage, and the regression
coeﬃcient on DR ∗ R ∗ LEV indicates the impact of leverage on the Basu measure. Con-
sistent with prior research, Column A shows that this interaction coeﬃcient is 0.032 and is
statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that leverage and the Basu (1997) measure
are indeed positively correlated.
Moving to Column B of Table 6, where we interact LEV with our Default-Adjusted-Basu
(DAB) measure, the interacting coeﬃcient on RA ∗ DAR ∗ LEV is now -0.021, which is
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result means that the degree of
conservatism is not positively correlated with leverage when the bias in the Basu measure is
corrected for.16
16The fact that the interaction eﬀect observed is negative seems to suggest that as a firm gets more leveraged
up, the agency problem between debtholders and equityholders may actually induce the firm to adopt an
even lower degree of conservatism, thereby allowing the equityholders to extract an even greater amount of
wealth from the debtholders. However, a thorough investigation of this topic is outside the scope of this
33
To further increase the robustness of our result, we conduct an augmented AACF regres-
sion with LEV as an additional variable, as shown in Column C of Table 6. The interaction
eﬀect between LEV and the AACF measure of conservatism is indicated by the coeﬃcient
on CFO ∗DCFO ∗LEV , which is -0.002 and is not statistically significant. Thus, the result
of this AACF test concurs with our previous two tests in that LEV may not be positively
correlated with the actual degree of accounting conservatism, and that the observed positive
correlation between LEV and the Basu measure of conservatism is likely the consequence of
a bias caused by default-risk.
While AACF controls for conservatism, we find that the DAB measure is superior to
AACF because, first, AACF uses cash flow as a proxy for value shocks or ‘news’. This is
more noisy than stock returns, or better, asset returns. Hence, the DAB measure retains the
advantage of the Basu model but avoids its biases. Second, many studies on conservatism
and leverage have been undertaken using the Basu measure, not AACF. It is therefore more
appropriate to analyze the Basu model using DAB rather than AACF.
7 Conclusions
The main implication of our results for the literature concerns how researchers should explain
the existing literature’s finding that leverage and the Basu measure are positively associated.
There are two possible explanations: one explanation is that high leverage leads to greater
demands for accounting conservatism due to creditors’ incentives to protect themselves when
agency costs are high. Our explanation is that leverage and the actual degree of accounting
conservatism may not be positively correlated: rather the observed positive correlation may
simply be the result from leverage controlling for the extent of the upward bias in the original
Basu measure. Our empirical evidence strongly supports this second explanation: LEV is
paper.
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probably not a real determinant of accounting conservatism, and is instead simply a control
for the bias in the Basu (1997) measure of accounting conservatism.
Recently, Khan and Watts (2009) developed a modified Basu measure of accounting con-
servatism based on firm-year specific measures. In Khan and Watts’ (2009) new measure of
conservatism, the leverage ratio is used as one of the key instrumental variables for deter-
mining the degree of accounting conservatism for each firm-year. However, if our findings are
valid, then the use of leverage in the Khan and Watts’ measure of conservatism needs to be
reconsidered.
In conclusion, we have analytically and empirically demonstrated that the Basu measure
is, in general, upward biased due to the existence of default risk, and that the magnitude
of this bias tends to increase with the level of default risk. We have also proposed a new
measure of accounting conservatism – the Default-Adjusted-Basu (DAB) measure – in order
to address the issue of bias in the original Basu (1997) measure. Our empirical results suggest
that the DAB measure can substantially reduce or even eliminate the default-risk bias, and
therefore can produce a more accurate measure of the degree of accounting conservatism.
An implication of our paper for the accounting literature is that there is a need for a
reconsideration of measures of accounting conservatism in the context of higher leverage and
risk of default. Our analytical and empirical results suggest that the positive association of
leverage with the Basu (1997) measure may simply be a result of an increase in the default-
risk bias in the Basu measure in highly-leveraged firms, which masks the true relationship
between leverage and accounting conservatism. Therefore, further research is required to
re-examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and leverage.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we first present indicative proofs of Propositions 1 and 3, and then provide
two computer simulations as demonstrations of the eﬀect of default risk on the Basu ATC.
Proof of Proposition 1
From Equation 13, we have
β2 = k2
cov
￿
E˜1, x˜ | x˜ < µ
￿
var
￿
E˜1 | x˜ < µ
￿
Thus whether β2 is equal to k2 or not depends on the value of the covariance/variance term
that is multiplied to it. We show below that the cov(.)/var(.) term is greater than 1 and
therefore β2 is biased. First, we established earlier that:
E [max (x˜−D, 0)] ≥ µ−D (22)
Now, using Jensen’s inequality again as well as Inequality 22, we can now derive the following
inequality for the numerator term. (For clarity we drop x˜ < µ from the expressions, but it
continues to hold.)
cov
￿
E˜1, x˜
￿
= E
￿
E˜1x˜
￿
− E
￿
E˜1
￿
E (x˜)
= E [max (x˜−D, 0) x˜]− E [max (x˜−D, 0)]E [x˜]
≥ max ￿E ￿x˜2￿− E (Dx˜) , 0￿− (µ−D)µ
= E
￿
x˜2
￿−Dµ− µ2 +Dµ
= σ2 (23)
The demoninator is:
var
￿
E˜1
￿
= E
￿
E˜21
￿
− E
￿
E˜1
￿2
= E
￿
(max (x˜−D, 0))2￿− E [max (x˜−D, 0)]2 (24)
It is easy to see intuitively that [max (x−D, 0)]2 ≤ (x−D)2, ∀x ∈ X. The inequality must
be true, because when x−D is less than zero, the left-hand side is zero, while the right-hand
side term is a square of a negative number, which is positive. On the other hand, when x−D
is positive, both sides are the same. Thus, summing up over x ∈ X and calculating their
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expected value, we obtain
E
￿
(max (x˜−D, 0))2￿ ≤ E ￿(x˜−D)2￿ (25)
Substitute Inequalities 22, 25 into Equality 24, and we get
var
￿
E˜1
￿
= E
￿
E˜21
￿
− E
￿
E˜1
￿2
= E
￿
max (x˜−D, 0)2￿− E [max (x˜−D, 0)]2
≤ E ￿(x˜−D)2￿− (µ−D)2
= σ2 (26)
In short, the above inequality states that
var
￿
E˜1
￿
≤ σ2 (27)
Thus, by combing Inequalities 23 and 27, we have the following conclusion
cov
￿
E˜1, x˜ | x˜ < µ
￿
≥ σ2 ≥ var
￿
E˜1 | x˜ < µ
￿
Thus,
cov
￿
E˜1, x˜ | x˜ < µ
￿
var
￿
E˜1 | x˜ < µ
￿ ≥ 1
that is
β2 ≥ k2
and hence β1 = β2 − β0 ≥ k1.17
Proof of Proposition 3
The following proof is simple and follows the structure of the proof of Proposition 1.
17Note the sign ≥ can be replaced by the sign >, thus removing the possibility of equality all together,
if the E˜ is a strictly convex function of µ. Pursuing this idea would take us far afield from accounting into
mathematics. Therefore, we supplement the mathematical proof with two computer simulations to show that
the sign is indeed > and therefore the Basu ATC is indeed upwards biased.
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b2 =
cov
￿
R˜A,
e˜+ i
A0
| R˜A < 0
￿
var
￿
e+ i
A0
| R˜A < 0
￿ = cov
￿
x˜− µ
µ
,
µ+ k2 (x˜− µ)− i+ i
µ
| R˜A < 0
￿
var
￿
µ+ k2 (x˜− µ)− i+ i
µ
| R˜A < 0
￿
=
cov [x˜− µ, µ+ kj (x˜− µ) | x˜ < µ]
var [x˜− µ | x˜ < µ] = k2
Similarly,
b0 = k0
Thus, the DAB measure, b1, is an unbiased estimator of accounting conservatism.
Computer Simulations
Here we provide two computer simulations to illustrate that the Basu ATC is indeed biased by
the presence of debt and default risk. We use these simulations to corroborate our theoretical
results. In particular, the theoretical results hold for two very well-known distributions x˜:
(1) a uniform distribution and (2) a lognormal distribution. The simulation procedure and
results are discussed below.
a) For a uniform distribution of cash flow x˜:
First, we set up some common parameters: for simplicity, we assume that the good news
timeliness is k0 = 0.5, and the bad news timeliness is k2 = 1. So our ficticious firm would
recognize 50% of good news in the period in which it arises, but all 100% of the bad news
immediately. The degree of conservatism following this setup is k1 = 1− 0.5 = 0.5.
We first randomly generate 1000 realizations of cash flow x˜ based on a uniform distribution
in the domain X = [0, 1]. The mean of x˜ is µ = 0.5. It is clear that the value of the firm
at date t0 is just the expected value 0.5. Then we set the face value of debt to the initial
value Dj=0 = 0, which is the situation where the firm has no borrowing at all. Then, for
this initial level of debt, Dj=0, we calculate the 1000 realizations for the value of equity,
E˜1, each of which corresponding to a particular realization of the cash flows x˜ generated
earlier. For example, for cash flow xi, where i ∈ [1, 1000], we calculate the value of equity
by E1i = max [(xi −Dj), 0]. Based on the generated data of 1000 pairs of xi and E1i, we
then conduct the reduced form Basu regression (Equation 13) and estimate the ATC. This
result gives us the ATC corresponding to Dj=0 = 0. Since, there is no debt in this situation
at all, we expect to see ATC very close to the true value of conservatism, which is k1 = 0.5.
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Figure 3: Uniform Distribution Simulation Result
Indeed this is the case as shown in Figure 3.
Now let us see how the Basu ATC responds when we increase the value of debt, Dj, in
small increments. For every increment, we increase Dj by 100th of 0.49, which is 0.0049, and
we increaseDj 100 times, until the final value isD100 = 0.49 – just slightly below the expected
value of the firm 0.5.18 In each increment, we regenerate 1000 realizations of cash flows and
use them to calculate the values of equity based on the rule that E1i = max [(xi −Dj), 0]. In
other words, we generate 1000 new pairs of (xi, Ri) for each small increment of D. Then we
run the reduced form Basu regression (Equation 13) and calculate the ATC using those 1000
simulated observations. Since we run this regression 101 times from D0 = 0 to D100 = 0.49,
we can obtain 101 diﬀerent estimates of ATC, each of which corresponds to a particular value
of debt Dj.
In Figure 3, the results of these 101 Basu ATC estimates are plotted against their respec-
tive Dj. It is immediately clear that when the maturity value of debt Dj increases, the Basu
ATC also increases. When debt is zero, the Basu ATC is unbiased: β1 = k1 = 0.5. However,
as Dj increases, the Basu ATC gradually rises and eventually reaches the highest point where
D100 = 0.49. This simulation clearly demonstrates that the presence of debt financing causes
bias to the Basu ATC measure of conservatism, and the greater the level of debt relative to
equity, the greater is the bias.
18Note the regularity condition that D < µ.
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Figure 4: Standard Lognormal Distribution Simulation Result
b) For a lognormal distribution of cash flow x˜:
In the second simulation exercise, we assume that cash flow x˜ follows a standard lognormal
distribution, i.e. x˜ ∼ lnN (0, 1). A lognormal distribution is far more realistic than uniform
distribution and it is the usual distribution that financial researchers assume for stock prices.
The expected value of cash flow according to this distribution is µ = exp(1/2) ≈ 1.65. The
domain of cash flow is X = (0, +∞). In this case, we still choose the initial D0 to be
zero, indicating zero debt. As we did with the uniform distribution, we gradually move Dj
up, each step by 100th of 1.64, that is 0.0164, for 100 steps. The highest value of Dj is
therefore D101 = 0.164, which means that it satisfies the investor rationality constraint that
D < µ. Then we repeated the same procedure discussed above with regards to the uniform
distribution to estimate the basu ATC for each value of Dj.
The results of simulating the lognormal distribution for cash flows are plotted in Figure 4.
We can see that there is clearly an increasing trend in the Basu ATC as the level of leverage
increases. It can also be seen that in the case of D = 0, which is located at the bottom-left
corner of Figure 3, the ATC is exactly the true degree of conservatism that β1 = k1 = 0.5,
but at all other values of D, the ATC is above the true degree of conservatism, which again
confirms our theoretical results.
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